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Understanding others: empathy and cognitive perspective taking
in the human brain
Abstract
After defining “cognitive perspective taking” and “empathy” we will review the main results of
neuroscientific studies of the human ability to understand other people's intentions, beliefs, and
experiences. We will then present several fMRI studies investigating empathic brain responses elicited
by the observation of others in pain and show how these empathic brain responses are modulated by
several contextual and stimulus factors. We will integrate these results with findings on patients with
Alexithymia (inability to understand and label distinct emotions and emotional experiences) and Autistic
Spectrum Disorder (ASD; a neurological condition associated with a variety of social and linguistic
deficits) to create a deeper understanding of the relations between interoceptive awareness, empathy,
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From the moment we are born, we interact with our social environment. Long-
term deprivation of social interaction causes uttermost despair and neural damage 
(Innocenti, 2007), supporting the notion that human beings are innately social. The 
question of how “peoples’ thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by the actual, 
imagined, or implied presence of others” is the focus of research in social psychology 
(Allport, 1985). The long and fruitful tradition of social psychological research has 
produced a variety of empirical approaches and models concerning prosocial motives, 
emotions and behavior, as outlined in the other chapters of this book.   
The field of neuroscience has only recently become interested in studying the 
affective and social brain. A new interdisciplinary field, social neuroscience, has emerged 
from a union of classical cognitive neuroscience and social psychology. Recent 
neuroscientific research has addressed classical social psychological issues such as 
peoples’ ability to understand other people’s minds: their beliefs, intentions, and feelings. 
In the first part of this chapter we summarize the social neuroscience perspective on 
“understanding others” and describe some of the key research findings. The second part 
of the chapter discusses approaches and results related to the study of empathy and 
prosocial behavior in social and developmental psychology. The last part of the chapter 
provides a preliminary integration of the social neuroscience and social psychology 
perspectives and discusses implication for future research.  
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“Understanding Others” in Social Neuroscience 
At first, social neuroscience focused mainly on the investigation of basic social 
abilities (for a review and overviews, see Adolphs, 1999, 2003; Blakemore, Winston, & 
Frith, 2004; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). Several functional neuroimaging studies, for 
example, have investigated the neural correlates of attending, recognizing, and 
remembering socially relevant stimuli such as the facial expressions of fear, attractive 
faces, indicators of trustworthiness, racial identity, and faces of fair and unfair players in 
a game (Hart et al., 2000; Morris et al., 1996; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Singer et al., 2004; 
Winston et al., 2002).  
More recently, social neuroscientists have begun to clarify the neural mechanisms 
underlying our ability to understand other people’s beliefs and thoughts, an ability known 
as having a “theory of mind” (e.g., Premack & Woodruff, 1978), “mentalizing” (Frith & 
Frith, 2003), “mindreading” (Baron-Cohen, 1995), or “cognitive perspective taking”; and 
our ability to share other people’s feelings, referred to as “empathy” (for a similar 
distinction between cognitive and affective aspects of reactions to other people, see Blair, 
2005; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Gallese, 2003; Keysers & 
Gazzola, 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Singer, 2006). Even though mentalizing and 
empathizing are often used in concert when we try to understand other people’s minds, 
preliminary evidence from studies of patients with marked social deficits, such as autism 
or psychopathy, suggest that mentalizing and empathizing are two distinct abilities that 
rely on different neural circuitries (see also Figure 1; Blair, 2005; Singer, 2006). For 
example, patients with autistic spectrum disorders often have deficits in cognitive 
perspective taking, while psychopaths are very good at understanding other people’s 
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intentions and consequently at manipulating other people’s behavior. In contrast, 
psychopaths lack empathy, which may be part of the reason for their antisocial behavior.  
This dissociation points to an important difference between our ability to 
mentalize and our ability to empathize. Whereas both abilities play an important role in 
drawing inferences about other people’s cognitive and emotional states, it has been 
suggested that empathy is not just a matter of cognition, but also has motivational, 
emotional, and social aspects (for a similar argument, see de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). 
De Vignemont and Singer (2006) describe empathy as follows: We “empathize” with 
others when we have (a) an affective state (b) that is isomorphic to another person’s 
affective state and (c) was elicited by observing or imagining another person’s affective 
state, and (d) when we know that the other person’s affective state is the source of our 
own affective state.  
The first statement is important because it differentiates empathy from theory of 
mind, cognitive perspective taking, and mentalizing. The term “mentalizing” connotes a 
person’s ability to cognitively represent the mental states of others, including their 
affective states, without necessarily becoming emotionally involved. The term 
“empathizing” connotes the capacity to share other people’s feelings. Accordingly, when 
one empathizes with another person who is in pain, one feels the other person’s pain in 
one’s own body. In contrast, when one understands someone else’s thoughts, one does 
not feel the thought of the other in one’s own body. There are no qualia attached to the 
representation of the other person’s thoughts. This difference and its significance become 
clearer when we consider psychopaths: They do not have an impaired ability to 
understand other people’s wishes, beliefs, intentions, and desires, but they seem to lack 
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the embodied feeling of empathy, which allows non-psychopaths to anticipate and 
appreciate others’ suffering, thereby often preventing them from harming others. Thus, 
although psychopaths possess the ability to mentalize, they are not able to empathize (for 
a similar argument, see Blair, 2005). 
Part b of de Vignemont and Singer’s (2006) description of empathy is important 
in distinguishing “empathy” from “sympathy” or “compassion” (see Eisenberg & Miller, 
1987, for a similar distinction). In all three cases, we feel vicariously for the other person. 
But when we “empathize,” we share the other person’s feelings; when we “sympathize” 
or show “compassion” we do not necessarily share the same feeling. For example, to use 
first-person language for a moment, when I empathize with a person who is sad, I feel sad 
myself. When I sympathize with or feel compassion for a sad person, I feel pity, love, or 
concern for the person but am not sad myself. Also, when I notice that someone is jealous 
or envious of me, I can sympathize with or show compassion toward that person, but I am 
not jealous or envious myself. Further, empathy is not necessarily linked to prosocial 
motivation – that is, a wish to maximize the other person’s happiness or alleviate the 
other person’s distress, whereas there is such a link from sympathy or compassion to 
prosocial motivation and actions or action tendences. Empathy can be misused, for 
example, by a torturer who empathizes to find his victim’s weakest point, but he is far 
from showing compassion for the suffering person.  
Finally, de Vignemont and Singer’s (2006) conception of empathy distinguishes 
between “empathy” and what might be called emotional contagion. The latter refers to a 
reaction in which one shares an emotion with another person without realizing that the 
other person’s emotion was the trigger. For example, babies start crying when they hear 
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other babies crying, long before they develop a sense of a self separate from others. 
Those reactions might be a precursor of the development of a capacity for empathy (see 
Sagi & Hoffman, 1976), but they are not considered empathic responses per se, because 
the babies are not aware that they are vicariously feeling another person’s distress. 
This discussion emphasizes the difference between perspective taking, the cooler, 
more cognitive apprehension of others’ emotions, and empathy, which is a warmer, more 
embodied sharing of emotions perceived in another person. From the neuroscientific 
perspective, this distinction is expected to be reflected in differences in the neural 
systems involved in cognitive perspective taking and empathic sharing of emotions.  
“Theory of Mind” Studies  
Neuroimaging studies of cognitive perspective taking are often referred to as 
“theory of mind” experiments. In most cases, they are conducted with healthy adults, who 
are asked to understand the intentions, beliefs, and desires of a protagonist in a story or a 
cartoon (for a review, see Gallagher & Frith, 2003). Theory of mind studies have 
consistently revealed a neural network comprising the posterior superior temporal sulcus 
(STS), extending into the temporoparietal junctions (TPJ), the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), and sometimes the temporal poles (TP). A schematic representation of the 
mentalizing brain network is shown in Figure 1 in green.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Interestingly, the mPFC is involved not only when people mentalize other 
people’s thoughts, intentions, and beliefs, but also when people reflect on their own states 
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(Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005a). Jason Mitchell (Mitchell et al., 2002, 2005b, 2006) 
recently conducted a series of experiments on mentalizing, which revealed functional 
differences between judging the mental states of similar and dissimilar others. A more 
ventral part of the mPFC was recruited when participants made self-judgments or 
judgments about people whom they perceived as being similar to themselves with respect 
to appearance or political attitudes. By contrast, a more dorsal part of the mPFC showed 
enhanced activation – close to the activation found in the mentalizing studies cited above 
– when participants judged the mental states of people perceived as being dissimilar to 
themselves. This suggests that we use two different strategies when inferring other 
people’s mental states: With one strategy, we simulate the other person’s states on the 
basis of knowledge we have about ourselves; with the other strategy, we infer the mental 
states of the other on the basis of more abstract knowledge about the world. 
Studies of Empathy  
While theory of mind research focuses on complex inferences about abstract 
mental states such as other people’s beliefs, another line of neuroscientific research has 
focused on our ability to understand other people’s goals and intentions by neuronally 
simulating them. This line of research is based on the ground-breaking discovery of 
“mirror neurons” in monkey premotor cortex, which fired both when a monkey 
performed hand movements itself and when it merely observed another monkey or a 
human performing the same hand movements (Ferrari et al., 2003; Gallese et al., 1996; 
Rizzolatti et al., 1996). Later on, a similar common coding of the perception and 
generation of motor actions was demonstrated in the human brain, using imaging 
techniques such as PET or fMRI (for a review, see Grezes & Decety, 2001). In line with 
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the monkey studies, the human studies revealed that the same circuitry was recruited 
when participants merely observed another person performing an action and when they 
performed the same action themselves.  
The idea that perception-action links in the brain enable us to understand others, a 
claim that was originally established in the motor domain, has recently been expanded to 
feelings and sensations (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety 
& Lamm, 2006; Gallese, 2003; Preston & de Waal, 2002). Indeed, fMRI studies in 
humans have provided evidence that such shared neural networks enable us to “share” 
pain, touch, or disgust with another person merely by perceiving or imagining the other 
person in a relevant situation, in the absence of any stimulation of our own body. For 
example, a study by Wicker et al. (2003) showed that viewing pictures of disgusted faces 
and smelling disgusting odors produced corresponding neural responses in viewers. Jabbi 
et al. (2007) had participants watch video clips showing people sampling pleasant and 
unpleasant tastes, and then experience the different tastes themselves. Both studies 
(Wicker et al., 2003; Jabbi et al., 2007) found neural activation in anterior insula cortex 
(see Figure 1), a brain region involved in processing disgust and taste, among other 
sensations, when people passively watched disgust in another person and when they were 
disgusted themselves.  
The majority of studies on empathic brain responses have been conducted in the 
domain of pain (Avenanti et al., 2005, 2006; Botvinick et al., 2005; Bufalari et al., 2007; 
Cheng et al., 2007; Gu & Han, 2007; Moriguchi et al., 2007; Jackson et al., 2005, 2006; 
Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; Morrison et al., 2004, 2007; Morrison & Downing, 
2007; Singer et al., 2004, 2006; Saarela et al., 2007). For example, in an early study, 
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Singer and colleagues (2004) recruited couples and measured empathy “in vivo” by 
assessing brain activity in the female partner while painful stimulation was applied either 
to her own or to her partner’s right hand via electrodes attached to the back of the hand. 
The male partner was seated next to the MRI scanner and a mirror system allowed the 
female partner to see her own as well as her partner’s hand lying on a tilted board in front 
of her. Before the experiment started, the couples were allowed to engage in social 
interaction to increase the feeling of being in a “real-life situation.” Differently colored 
flashes of light on a screen behind the board pointed to either the male or the female 
partner’s hand, indicating which of them would receive painful and which would receive 
non-painful stimulation.  
This procedure permitted the measurement of pain-related brain activation when 
pain was applied to the scanned participant (felt pain) or to her partner (empathy for 
pain). The results indicated that parts of the so-called “pain matrix” – bilateral anterior 
insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum – were 
activated when participants experienced pain themselves as well as when they saw a 
signal indicating that a loved one had experienced pain. These areas are involved in the 
processing of the affective component of pain – that is, the degree to which the 
subjectively felt pain is unpleasant. Thus, both the experience of one’s own pain and the 
knowledge that a beloved partner is experiencing pain activate the same affective pain 
circuits, suggesting that if a beloved partner suffers pain, our brains also cause us to 
suffer from this pain.  
Activation in this network was also observed when participants saw an unknown 
but likeable person suffering pain (Singer et al., 2006) or watched videos showing body 
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parts in potentially painful situations (Jackson et al., 2005, 2006), painful facial 
expressions (Lamm et al., 2007), or hands being pricked by needles (Morrison et al., 
2004; for a review, see de Vignemont & Singer, 2006).  
Analyses of empathic brain responses obtained while participants were observing 
other people suffering – be it their loved ones or people the participants liked (Singer et 
al., 2004, 2006) – have revealed individual differences in activity in empathy-related 
pain-sensitive areas (ACC and AI). According to the results of Singer and associates, 
these differences co-vary with scores on the Empathic Concern Scale of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) and the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES; 
Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). The higher participants scored on these questionnaires, the 
higher their activation in ACC and anterior insula. Interestingly, Jabbi et al. (2007) 
observed similar correlations between IRI subscales and empathic brain responses in the 
anterior insula among participants who had observed others tasting pleasant or unpleasant 
drinks associated with facial expressions of joy or disgust.  
Empathic brain responses are positively correlated not only with trait measures of 
empathy, but also with unpleasantness ratings given online after each trial of an empathy-
inducing task (Jackson et al., 2005; Lamm et al., 2007; Saarela et al., 2007). Future 
research will have to clarify how these individual differences in empathic brain responses 
come about and whether they are able to explain individual differences in prosocial 
behavior, two lines of research which have not yet been sufficiently addressed. 
“Understanding Others” in Social Psychology 
In social psychology, the term most commonly used in the context of 
understanding others’ emotional states is empathy. Depending on the focus of research, 
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different definitions of empathy have been offered. Hoffman (1981, p. 44) proposed a 
relatively broad definition: “an affective response appropriate to someone else’s situation 
rather than one’s own.” He considered empathy to be the result of a developmental 
sequence, beginning with babies crying when they hear another baby’s cry and arriving, 
after considerable development, at a clear sense of others as distinct from the self. 
Perceived distress in the other can elicit “empathic distress” or “sympathetic distress.” 
The latter is the basis for altruistic motivation, which consists mainly of the urge to 
relieve one’s own distress. 
Eisenberg and her associates (see review in Eisenberg, Chapter 7, this volume) 
distinguish between empathy and sympathy. Empathy is defined as “an affective state 
that stems from the apprehension of another’s emotional state or condition, and that is 
congruent with it” (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p. 91). Sympathy is defined as “an 
emotional response stemming from another’s emotional state or condition that is not 
identical to the other’s emotion, but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for 
another’s welfare” (p. 92). Empathy in its pure form is not other-oriented. With further 
cognitive processing it can turn into sympathy, personal distress, or a combination of 
both (Eisenberg, 2000). Prosocial behavior is negatively correlated with personal distress, 
and positively associated with sympathy (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Sympathy can 
derive from empathy, but also from cognitive perspective taking. In children, empathic 
responding is observed in the second year of life (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & King, 
1979; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). It correlates with 
parents’ expressivity, mediated by the level of the child’s effortful control (Valiente et al., 
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2004), and predicts measurable prosocial dispositions, which are stable across five years 
in early adulthood (Eisenberg et al., 2002). 
The term “empathic concern,” introduced by Batson (see review in Chapter 1, this 
volume) is similar to Eisenberg’s definition of sympathy. Empathic concern is defined as 
an other-oriented response congruent with the perceived distress experienced by another 
person (e.g., Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995). It is elicited by adopting the other’s 
perspective and requires valuing the other’s welfare (Batson, Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & 
Ortiz, 2007). In many cases, similarity between the individual and the person in need 
increases empathic concern (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981) but is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005). 
Valuing the welfare of the other is also affected by similarity, and remains stable even 
after situational empathy has declined (Batson et al., 1995).  
In line with the results of Eisenberg and associates on children and young adults 
(e.g., Eisenberg, & Miller, 1987), the findings of Batson and colleagues support the 
assumption that feeling empathy for a person in need leads to increased helping, one kind 
of prosocial behavior. Experiments have shown that most people are willing to receive 
uncomfortable electrical shocks themselves in order to help another person in need, even 
if they are offered an “easy escape” that would not require helping. Only people who 
report a high level of personal distress instead of empathy prefer to escape rather than 
help (Batson, 1991).   
What is the difference between someone who is empathic and helps, and someone 
who is distressed and opts to escape? One approach to answering this question is to 
identify personality traits that make up a “prosocial personality” (Penner, Fritzsche, 
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Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995; Penner & Orom, Chapter 3, this volume). Penner and 
associates have identified two major components of a prosocial personality. The first 
concerns prosocial thoughts and feelings, such as a sense of responsibility and a tendency 
to experience cognitive and affective empathy. A second factor concerns being helpful – 
that is, perceiving oneself as someone who is willing and able to help. Both factors are 
significantly associated with actual prosocial behavior, such as helping co-workers or 
volunteering in the community (e.g., Penner, 2002; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & 
Schroeder, 2005).  
Another framework for investigating individual differences in empathy and 
prosocial behavior is attachment theory, proposed originally by Bowlby (1982) and 
elaborated and experimentally tested by Mikulincer and Shaver (2007; also Chapters 4 
and 13 in the present volume). According to this theory, human beings are innately 
equipped with attachment and caregiving behavioral systems. The attachment system is 
especially apparent during the first years of life, but has also proven to influence social 
interactions across the life span (Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). 
Individual differences in attachment style can be measured along two orthogonal 
dimensions, attachment-related anxiety and avoidance (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998). 
Relatively low scores on these dimensions indicate attachment security, which has been 
associated with empathy in young children (2 to 3 years old; Kerstenbaum, Farber, & 
Sroufe, 1989; van der Mark, van IJzendoorn, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2002) and in 
adults (Mikulincer et al., 2001). Increasing security by experimental techniques such as 
implicit and explicit priming has been shown to affect compassion and altruistic behavior 
(Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005), whereas attachment insecurity can 
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interfere with the natural tendency to help others in need (Gillath, Shaver, & Mikulincer, 
2005; Feeney & Collins, 2001; also Collins, Chapter 18, this volume). 
Besides the influences of individual differences, the relation between empathy and actual 
prosocial behavior is influenced by social factors, such as whether the person in need is 
seen as a member of one’s own or a different group (Dovidio, Gaertner, Johnson, 
Ashburn-Nardo, & Spicer, Chapter 20, this volume). There is a large body of evidence 
indicating strong favoritism toward members of one’s group (e.g., Hewstone, Rubin, & 
Willis, 2002; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Empathy is a better predictor of helping an 
ingroup member, probably because empathic concern is facilitated by familiarity and 
attachment, whereas prosocial behavior toward outgroup members is based on factors 
such as attraction (Sturmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005). Taking the perspective of an 
outgroup member (Finlay, & Stephan, 2000), however, or focusing on the person’s 
feelings (Batson et al., 1997; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003) reduces intergroup 
prejudice and bias (Dovidio et al., 2004).  
“Understanding Others” in Neuroscience and Social Psychology: 
An Integrative Perspective 
 In both disciplines, empathy is seen as central for our ability to understand 
another person’s emotional states, but does “empathy” have the same meaning in social 
neuroscience and in social and developmental psychology? In some social psychological 
definitions, empathy is viewed as an affective response that is congruent with (Eisenberg 
& Miller, 1987) or appropriate for (Hoffman, 1981) another’s emotion. Other definitions 
emphasize that empathy is related to adopting the other’s perspective (e.g., Batson et al., 
1995). While affective empathic responses and perspective taking are often linked, the 
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reviewed neuroscientific studies suggest a clear distinction between putting oneself into 
another’s shoes (or mind: cognitive perspective taking) and sharing the other’s affective 
state in an embodied manner (empathy). Accordingly, part of the conception of empathy 
in social neuroscience is based on its demarcation from cognitive perspective taking 
(Blair, 2005; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2007; Gallese, 2003; 
Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Singer, 2006). This distinction is in line with early social 
psychological work, which also proposed a distinction between perspective taking and 
empathic concern (e.g., Coke, Batson, & Mc Davis, 1978).  
Although so far empathy research in the two disciplines has developed relatively 
independently, there is consistency between measures of empathy in social psychology 
and neuroscience. This is reflected by the covariation of individual scores on empathy 
questionnaires such as the IRI (Davis, 1980) and the BEES (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) 
with empathy-related activation of ACC and anterior insula (Singer et al., 2004, 2006). 
Social neuroscience has taken only preliminary steps in investigating individual 
differences in empathy-related brain activity. But it is already clear that the neural 
empathy response is related to a participant’s affective ties to the other person (Singer et 
al., 2004, 2006), the participant’s appraisal of whether the other person’s suffering is 
justified (Lamm et al., 2007), prior experience with the situation (Cheng et al., 2007), and 
the intensity of the inflicted pain (e.g., seeing a needle pricking vs. penetrating a muscle, 
Avenanti et al., 2006).  
It would now be worthwhile to investigate whether differences in prosocial 
personality traits (Penner, 2002) or attachment styles (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007) 
predict differences in activation of the brain network associated in social neuroscience 
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studies of empathy. There is already evidence that attachment-style differences in ability 
to suppress emotionally painful thoughts modulate brain activity (Gillath, Bunge, Shaver, 
Wendelken, & Mikulincer, 2005).  
Another focus for future research would be possible links between empathic brain 
responses, sympathy, and prosocial behavior. Based on current neuroscientific evidence it 
is difficult to decide whether empathic brain responses reflect feeling like the other 
person, in the sense of simulation the other’s feelings, or feeling for the other, in the 
sense of sympathy. One way to disentangle the two would be to correlate empathic brain 
responses with nuanced situational self-reports, as already done in social psychology (for 
example, in distinguishing between empathy and personal distress). Moreover, social and 
developmental psychologists have designed clever experimental paradigms to investigate 
the links between empathy or sympathy and prosocial behavior, and some of these could 
be adapted for neuroscience experiments.  
Working from the other side of the disciplinary divide, social and developmental 
psychologists might be able to avoid some difficulties in previous empathy research by 
using neuroimaging methods. For example, in many behavioral empathy studies, 
participants are repeatedly asked to report their feelings. This can be problematic, 
because it creates strong demand characteristics (Eisenberg, & Lennon, 1983) and may 
induce social desirability biases. Neuroimaging methods should be beneficial in such 
cases, because empathy and related phenomena can be investigated without such explicit 
instructions and self-observations (e.g., Singer et al., 2004, 2006). Moreover, 
neuroimaging methods can help to disentangle separate psychological processes, which 
may have similar behavioral correlates, yet be importantly distinct. For example, 
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emotionally empathizing with or cognitively taking the perspective of another person can 
lead to the same behavioral outcome, but if they have different neural correlates they can 
be more carefully distinguised. Another interesting contribution of neuroscience methods 
is the quantification of changes in empathic response over the life span and as a function 
of empathy training or other interventions. For example, assessing the neural plasticity in 
empathic responses in children of different ages would add to our understanding of 
developmental aspects of empathy, complementing the already existing behavioral data.  
Last but not least, our brains do not exist in isolation and their functioning should 
be modulated by the social factors and culture, on the “meso-level” of groups and the 
“macro-level” of society (Penner et al., 2005). According to research in social 
psychology, ingroup and intergroup processes have strong effects on empathy and 
prosocial behavior (Dovidio et al., 2004), but such effects have not yet been explored 
with neuroscientific methods. It would be interesting to investigate whether ingroup and 
intergroup effects modulate empathy-related brain activity, opening yet another broad 
avenue for future social neuroscience research. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Social neuroscience and social and developmental psychology have contributed 
different pieces to the large, complex puzzle of empathy and prosocial behavior, as 
visualized in Figure 2. So far, social neuroscience has elucidated how emotional 
contagion and empathy are implemented in the human brain, but it has not yet explored 
how empathy, sympathy, and empathic concern affect prosocial behavior. Empathy 
research in social and developmental psychology starts there, providing knowledge and 
measures related to connections between mental processes, individual differences, and 
prosocial behavior.  It will prove useful to have a more extensive dialogue between the 
different kinds of researchers. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have reviewed findings related to empathy and prosocial 
behavior from social neuroscience and social and developmental psychology. In the 
young field of social neuroscience, empathy research has focused on identifying brain 
regions and mechanisms involved in empathy and perspective taking, which leaves a 
variety of open questions concerning the sources of individual differences in empathic 
brain responses, the development of the empathic brain, and the links between empathic 
brain responses and actual helping behavior. Social and developmental psychologists 
have acquired expertise in these domains. We are convinced that integrating and linking 
the social neuroscience and the social and developmental psychology of empathy and 
prosocial behavior will be fruitful for both fields and will improve our understanding of a 
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Figure 1. Brain networks involved in understanding others. Schematic representation of 
the brain areas typically involved in theory of mind (green) and empathy (orange) tasks. 
MFC = medial prefrontal cortex; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; AI = anterior insula; 
SII = secondary somatosensory cortex; TP = temporal poles; STS = superior temporal 
sulcus; TPJ = temporo-parietal junction. 
 
Figure 2. Summary of complementary foci of research on empathy and prosocial 
behavior in social neuroscience and social and developmental psychology. 
 
